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Abstract 
The principal component of a European social model was considered to be 
convergence of social outcomes toward the top. However, the latest eco-
nomic and social trends are no longer characterized by a steady narrowing 
of the gap between the more and lesser advanced countries.  While all Euro-
pean countries were affected by the economic crisis of 2008 and a coordi-
nated response was put into place in 2009, since 2010, we see a growing 
divergence between two groups of countries in Europe.  The first group, 
mainly in the North of Europe, concentrated around Germany, Austria, the 
Nordic countries, along with certain Eastern European countries having 
close economic ties to Germany, has steadily emerged from the crisis and 
resumed a positive economic and social path.  The second group, however, 
comprised mainly of the Southern and Eastern periphery, remains stuck in 
negative economic and social situations following the crisis. This chapter 
demonstrates the initial economic convergence, followed by a stark diver-
gence in certain economic and social outcomes after the crisis of 2008. It 
reviews the various explanations for these divergences. Finally, it considers 
the political outcomes of this economic and social dualization. We argue that 
despite the seemingly uniform rise of populist anti-EU challengers across 
Europe, these challengers differ significantly in the grievances they raise. 
Radical right parties are dominant in the center, while radical left parties 
outperform the radical right in the periphery, a dynamic that constitutes a 
second, political, dualization of Europe.  
Keywords: social convergence, European integration and populism 
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Introduction 
European countries are often distinguished from other highly devel-
oped countries by their commitment to a social model, visible mainly 
through a comparatively high level of public spending devoted to so-
cial policies. The “European model” rests on a common base level that 
was established in the Golden Years following World War II (1945-
1975), which aimed at full (male) employment, and a basic guarantee 
of social rights and well-being for Europe’s citizens.  However, a com-
mon and unified European social welfare system was never fully im-
plemented, as each member country of the now European Union (EU) 
has different labor market regulations and policies, social policies, and 
systems of social protection.   
Despite vast differences between member countries, a European social 
model was continually promoted and encouraged at the European 
level, throughout the evolution of the European Community and now 
EU. The principal component of a European social model was consid-
ered to be convergence toward the top in terms of social outcomes such 
as employment levels, standard of living, well-being, and social secu-
rity, rather than in terms of promoting convergence between national 
institutions of social protection, which differed already between the 
founding members of the European Community and continued to 
show difference over the course of various enlargements to the EC and 
later EU. The concept of ‘subsidiarity’ appeared in the European trea-
ties during the 1990s in order to signify the preservation of social pol-
icy as a national, rather than supra-national, policy-area domain.  
Nonetheless, since 1957 and the Treaty of Rome, various European-
level policies, notably structural funds, were put into place in order to 
allow less-developed regions to catch up to the average level of eco-
nomic and social development of the more developed European re-
gions; this was done to avoid a “race to the bottom”, seen as a potential 
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costly by-product of the common, and later single, European market 
(Palier, Pochet, 2005). Through the middle of the first decade of the 
21st century, a notable convergence was observable in terms of em-
ployment rates, living standards, and social spending among the EU 
member countries. 
However, the latest trends in terms of economic and social matters are 
no longer characterized by a steady narrowing of the gap between the 
more and lesser-advanced countries. While all European countries 
were affected by the economic crisis of 2008 and a coordinated re-
sponse was put into place in 2009, since 2010, we observe a growing 
divergence between two groups of countries in Europe. The first 
group, which we refer to in this paper as the “core” or “center” mainly 
in the North of Europe, concentrated around Germany, Austria, the 
Nordic countries, along with certain Eastern European countries hav-
ing close economic ties to Germany, has steadily emerged from the 
crisis and resumed a positive economic and social path. The second 
group, however, which we refer to as the “periphery”, comprised 
mainly of Southern and Eastern countries along with Ireland, remains 
stuck in negative economic and social situations following the crisis. 
The life prospects for individual Europeans are becoming increasingly 
differentiated by their native region, along with their age and skill-
level. 
Therefore, since 2010, Europe’s founding promise of shared prosper-
ity appears to no longer apply equally to all citizens, and the social 
objectives that have their roots in the creation of the European Com-
munities since the 1950s, which were reiterated and specified in the 
Lisbon Strategy of 2000 and then again in 2010 with the “Europe 
2020” vision, are not respected. In this paper, we explore the increas-
ing social and economic divergence between the central and peripheral 
European countries. In line with Iversen and Soskice (2018; see also 
Hall, 2014, Hassel, 2014), we put forth that these differences are not 
due solely to the economic crisis that hit Europe in 2008, but rather, to 
the different growth models and forms of social protection between 
these two groups of countries. 
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However, the divergence between these countries also stems from the 
policies that were undertaken in response to the crisis, notably since 
2010. The austerity measures put into place since 2010 have had the 
largest effect on the countries that suffered the most from the debt cri-
sis, which are located on the European periphery. In this paper, there-
fore, we investigate the extent to which the long-exalted European 
promise of prosperity and well-being for all has transformed into a 
well-being for some, even at the expense of others.  
While all EU countries were affected by the global financial crisis, the 
contribution this paper makes is to delineate the profile of dualization 
that has occurred across, and within, European countries in the years 
following the financial crisis. In order to analyze the sources and out-
comes of this social and economic dualization within Europe, we first 
present social and economic outcomes that show clear divergence be-
tween the core and periphery. We underline the novelty of this trend, 
since until the late 2000s, the tendency was on the contrary a closing 
gap between the leading and lagging EU members. In a second step, 
we then review several explanations for why this dualization has oc-
curred. We add here our own remarks on the impact of the policies 
implemented since 2010. In a third step, we consider the political im-
plications engendered by this economic and social divergence between 
the core and periphery.  We show that this dualization leads to a gen-
eral increase in dissatisfaction with Europe, manifested in the electoral 
success of radical left and radical right anti-EU parties. We show, 
however, that this radicalization is leaning towards the right-wing in 
the center, and towards the radical left in the periphery. 
 
The Social and Economic Dualization of Europe 
In considering the social and economic repercussions following the 
financial crisis of 2008, we observe that Europe continues to experi-
ence social duress, particularly in terms of unemployment, difficulties 
for youth to find employment opportunities, lower employment levels, 
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the number of working poor, and child poverty rates, as well as for 
those employed over age 55. The risk of poverty is a phenomenon that 
is unlikely to disappear, as the quality of jobs has diminished, wage 
inequality has increased, and part-time and temporary work have in-
creased. However, the degree to which precariousness constitutes a 
significant social risk varies greatly across countries, with two distinct 
groups of countries emerging, again falling neatly into either the center 
or periphery. On the one hand, Germany and Austria have curbed their 
deficits, with very low unemployment levels and positive growth be-
tween 2010-2012. In many aspects, the Nordic countries, the Nether-
lands, Luxembourg, the Czech Republic, and Poland seem to have 
emerged from the crisis in terms of positive economic growth rates, 
debt levels, and unemployment rates. On the other hand, the countries 
on the southern and eastern European periphery, along with Ireland, 
witnessed a stark deterioration first with the financial crisis, followed 
by the public debt crisis after 2010.   
The divergence between the two groups of countries (the North and 
center on the one hand, and the “banana-shaped” periphery of Ireland 
and southern and eastern Europe on the other) can be observed most 
markedly in terms of unemployment, but also in terms of the labor 
market situation for young people. While the gap in unemployment 
rates between the two groups of countries was nonexistent in 2007, it 
reached 7.5 percentage points, on average, in 2011. From one country 
and region to another, the gap gets wider, with Germany having a 3.9% 
unemployment rate, whereas Greece reports 23.5% unemployed in 
early 2017 (Eurostat 2017). 
The situation of young people shows an equally strong contrast be-
tween the two groups of countries. The youth unemployment rate (age 
15-24) reached an EU average of 17.3% in mid 2017, ranging from 
6.8% in Germany to 41% in Spain and 48% in Greece (Eurostat, 
2017). The percentage of young people under age 25 termed “NEETs” 
(not in education, employment, or training) marks another worrisome 
trend: in 2015, the figure ranged from 4.7% in the Netherlands, 6.2% 
in Germany, Luxembourg and Denmark, 6.7% in Sweden, and 7.5% 
in Austria to 14.3% in Ireland, 15.6% in Spain, 17.2% in Greece and 
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more than 18% in Romania, Bulgaria, and Italy, with an EU average 
of 12% (Eurofund, 2016).   
In order to go beyond disparate social indicators, we test whether there 
was a systematic social and economic dualization of Europe. To 
demonstrate this divide among European countries in the aftermath of 
the economic crisis, we run a cluster analysis, dividing the countries 
of the EU into two groups. This cluster analysis is based on observa-
tions from 2010 and later, and sorts countries based on three variables: 
GDP growth, unemployment levels, and the rate of population at risk 
of poverty1. Details are available in Table 1. The analysis yields a re-
sult that splits the continent into a central core of countries geograph-
ically proximate to Germany, and a periphery stretching from Latvia in 
the east, across the Mediterranean, and north to Ireland (see Figure 1). 
 
 
  
                                                 
1 We perform a kmeans partition cluster analysis with an absolute-value distance 
measure, using Stata’s ‘cluster kmeans’ command. This procedure separates our 
cases into one of two groups for each observed year, based on their relative proximity 
on the three assessed variables (GDP growth, unemployment levels, and the rate of 
population at risk of poverty). We then define those countries that cluster in group 1 
for most of the observed years as the periphery, and those that cluster in group 2 for 
most of the observed years as the center (see table 1).  
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Table 1: Cluster Analysis 
Country Years as Years as Total years Coding 
  group 1 group 2 observed   
Austria 0 5 5 Center 
Belgium 0 5 5 Center 
Bulgaria 5 0 5 Periphery 
Croatia 5 0 5 Periphery 
Czech Republic 0 5 5 Center 
Denmark 0 5 5 Center 
Estonia 0 5 5 Center 
Finland 0 5 5 Center 
France 0 5 5 Center 
Germany 0 5 5 Center 
Greece 5 0 5 Periphery 
Hungary 4 1 5 Periphery 
Ireland 5 0 5 Periphery 
Italy 3 2 5 Periphery 
Latvia 5 0 5 Periphery 
Lithuania 4 1 5 Periphery 
Luxembourg 0 5 5 Center 
Netherlands 0 5 5 Center 
Norway 0 3 3 Center 
Poland 1 4 5 Center 
Portugal 4 1 5 Periphery 
Romania 5 0 5 Periphery 
Slovak Republic 0 5 5 Center 
Slovenia 0 5 5 Center 
Spain 5 0 5 Periphery 
Sweden 0 5 5 Center 
United Kingdom 0 5 5 Center 
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Figure 1. Center and Periphery of the EU 
 
Social Outcomes across the Center and Periphery 
The dualization of Europe discussed above has significant socio-eco-
nomic consequences. The traditional convergence between the richest 
European regions and the poorest ones that characterized the develop-
ment of Europe since the late 1950s has been replaced with a dramatic 
divergence between the richer and poorer regions in the aftermath of 
the 2008 crisis. In order to demonstrate these dynamics of convergence 
and divergence, we estimate a number of difference-in-difference 
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models on socio-economic data from Eurostat, the OECD, and the 
World Bank.  
Difference-in-difference models simulate experimental design by as-
suming the presence of two groups. One group is considered the ex-
perimental group, while the other is the control group. Each group is 
measured at two different stages or time points, once before an exper-
imental treatment, and once after. The difference-in-difference model 
then estimates whether the treatment, which occurred between the first 
and the second measure, produced a statistically significant difference 
between the two groups. To put it another way, the model tests whether 
the two groups (no matter their original score on the measure of inter-
est) significantly converged, diverged, or remained similarly distant in 
the aftermath of the treatment.  
This statistical setup is particularly well suited for our purposes be-
cause it allows us to directly assess the convergence or divergence of 
the European core and periphery. For the purposes of this test, we as-
sign countries to the center and the periphery group based on the clus-
ter analysis described above. We thus consider Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom as forming the European center. Bulgaria, Croa-
tia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Ro-
mania and Spain make up the periphery.  
To test our expectation of initial convergence between the two groups 
prior to the economic crisis, followed by divergence after it, we carry 
out two difference-in-difference models for each indicator. In the first 
model, we set the initial period as the 1990s (1990-1999), and the sec-
ond period as the 2000s (2000-2009). We thus effectively test whether 
the two groups moved towards each other between these two decades, 
the hypothetical treatment being the convergence policies of the post-
1990 European Union. In the second model, we set the initial period 
as the 2000s (2000-2009), and the second period as the 2010s (data 
availability varies from 2010-2013, 2014, or 2015). Here we again test 
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the relative change in position of the two groups between the 2000s 
and the 2010s, with the hypothetical treatment being the package pol-
icies implemented since late 2009 in Europe, the impact of which is 
expected from 2010 onwards (see below for more information on these 
policies). We present the results of these models in a combined graph, 
connecting both tests in one panel, spanning from the 1990s over the 
2000s to the 2010s.  
 
 
Figure 2. Difference in difference models assessing socio-economic outcomes across 
the center and the periphery between the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s.  
 
The results presented in Figure 2 demonstrate initial European conver-
gence, followed by stark divergence of outcomes across the center and 
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the periphery of Europe2. The top left panel shows that while unem-
ployment rate converged between the 1990s and 2000s (Diff p<0.01), 
it diverged greatly in the aftermath of the economic crisis (Diff p<.01). 
Similarly, youth (15-24 year olds) unemployment exhibits significant 
convergence prior to the economic crisis (Diff p<0.01), followed by 
striking divergence (Diff p<0.01). In terms of GDP growth, the pe-
riphery converged towards the center, outperforming it in the 2000s 
(Diff p<0.1); however, after the economic crisis, the periphery again 
diverged from the center (Diff p<0.05). Finally, labor market partici-
pation showed a convergence before the crisis (Diff p<0.01), while in 
its aftermath this convergence slows (Diff insignificant). In sum, these 
results underline a certain amount of catch-up on the part of the Euro-
pean periphery between the 1990s and the 2000s, followed by a rever-
sal after 2010. In the following section, we review several explanations 
for why this dualization has occurred. 
 
Whence Comes this Dualization? 
When trying to explain the social and economic dualization of Europe, 
three main sets of explanations are put forward. The first set refers to 
the divergence in economic policies implemented before the crisis 
(successful completion of structural reforms on the one hand, wage 
growth, and increase in public expenditures on the other). The second 
set emphasizes the structural differences in growth and social models 
put together in Europe, especially within the Eurozone. The Euro-
zone’s divergence can be explained by the existence of markedly dif-
ferent growth models within the same economic zone. The third set 
refers to the policies implemented since the crisis that affected the two 
groups of countries differently. 
                                                 
2 The convergence trend is not unique to the 2000s, since it has been demonstrated 
for earlier periods, especially concerning the development of Southern countries 
within the EU 15 (Guillen, Palier, 2004). 
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The different policies before the crisis 
The strong divergence between EU countries in terms of macro-eco-
nomic and social protection profiles since 2010 can in fact be traced 
to differences between countries since the introduction of the Euro 
currency in 2002. On the one hand, what we term the “core, center 
countries” experienced low GDP growth, as well as low wage growth, 
low inflation, and managed to contain, and even decrease, their public 
expenditures from 2000-2007. These countries undertook major struc-
tural reforms of their labor markets (from 1990 onwards in the Nordic 
countries; from 2000 in Germany and Austria) and retirement systems 
(from the end of the 1990s in the Nordic countries and the beginning 
of the 2000s in Germany and Austria).   
At the same time, the “periphery” along Southern and Eastern Europe 
and including Ireland, experienced higher economic growth rates 
(with the exception of Italy and Portugal), witnessed salary increases 
to a greater degree than in the North, and did not contain their public 
expenditures. While these countries also implemented several labor 
market and social protection reforms, they were of lesser magnitude 
than those of the North. What seemed at first glance to be economic 
and social convergence between the core and periphery (the periphery, 
with higher growth, was catching up to the center), in fact resulted in 
increased competitiveness in the core countries, and decreased com-
petitiveness in the peripheral countries: major imbalances were lurk-
ing underneath the surface in terms of cost structure and current ac-
count balance (Boisson-Cohen et al., 2015).  
Disparate Social and Growth Models in the Euro-Zone 
Several studies seek to explain the differences in northern and south-
ern European trajectories. Martin Höpner and Mark Lutter (2014) em-
phasize the differences in industrial relations, notably in the systems 
of wage negotiations, between the two groups of countries. In the 
northern economies, general salary negotiations are guided by the 
manufacturing industry, where the social partners, being focused on 
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their industry’s competitiveness, negotiated wage restraint in the 
2000s in exchange for industrial employment security (see also Palier 
and Thelen 2010). Other sectors’ salary trajectories followed this gen-
eral trend, with labor market reforms also playing an important role.  
These traits of the core Europe’s growth model are related to the char-
acteristics of their (coordinated) political economy. On the contrary, 
with public sector and service sector salaries strongly increasing in 
southern Europe (where salary negotiations are not coordinated at the 
industry level but as a function of decentralized union bargaining), 
these countries witnessed higher inflation and decreased competitive-
ness and skewed balance of payments. As trade unions are known to 
be divided and the left to be fragmented in Southern Europe (see the 
general introduction to this book), there is much less capacity for eco-
nomic coordination and wage moderation. 
Peter Hall (2014) shows that these vast economic disparities between 
EU members reflect the existence of starkly different growth models 
within the Eurozone. Certain countries, notably Germany, rely on ex-
port-led growth founded on a high value-added manufacturing sector 
and skilled labor, as well as large research and development (R&D) 
investments.  Southern European growth models, on the other hand, 
are demand-led, based on internal consumption. Over the course of the 
2000s, consumption in these countries was sustained by wage growth 
and increased debt levels, whether private debt (Spain) or public debt 
(Greece, Italy). This consumption- and debt-based growth was made 
possible by low interest rates for Eurozone countries (See also Hassel, 
2014; Johnston and Regan, 2016).  
In a similar vein, Iversen and Soskice (2018) underline that the eco-
nomic arrangements of the Eurozone (the Maastricht criteria re-en-
forced by the Treaty of Lisbon) do not fit with the growth model of the 
South. The export-led growth model, which relies on wage moderation 
(or cuts), budgetary balance (or surplus), and which is imposed on all 
countries, has forced countries in the periphery to implement stark cuts 
and structural reforms of both their growth model and their welfare 
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system. This leads to the third interpretation of the divergence: the pol-
icies implemented since the crisis have had different implications for 
the two groups of countries. 
The Policies Targeting Welfare Spending Implemented Since the 
Crisis under EU Recommendation 
In 2011, most European countries were under a procedure for exces-
sive deficit. All countries had to control their budget deficit, inflation, 
and public expenditure. However, the policies implemented to do so 
had a much stronger impact on the countries in the periphery, first be-
cause their deficit and debt were much higher (so they had to imple-
mented harsher adjustment plans), but also because implementing aus-
terity measures on a domestic, demand-led growth (where domestic 
demand triggers growth and jobs) has much more recessive impact 
than on an export-led growth model (where wage moderation and bal-
anced budget are already part of the model) (Morel, Palier, 2011). 
The budgetary measures adopted since 2010 by European govern-
ments have been mainly of three different types: social policy reforms; 
privatizations; and a freezing of wages for civil servants, as well as a 
reduction in their number (Morel, Palier, 2011, Boisson-Cohen et al. 
2015). These measures corresponded most often with direct pressure 
from the EU, notably for the countries under supervision of the Troika 
(comprised of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the ECB, and 
the EU), but also as part of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (not to 
exceed 3% of GDP). As of spring 2011, 24 EU member states were 
still subjected to the deficit reduction procedure, whereas by spring 
2015, there were only eleven countries remaining under the procedure 
- these were mainly from the European periphery. 
A number of countries reduced unemployment benefits (Germany, 
Portugal, Romania, Denmark, Ireland, UK, Spain, Greece) in an effort 
to make employment more attractive. Several countries also restricted 
unemployment claimants’ rights to refuse an offer of employment 
(Spain, UK), and several measures were adopted that increased labor 
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market flexibility, notably for workers with open-ended contracts 
(Spain, Portugal, Denmark). However, unemployment benefits were 
not the only area that was curtailed: several countries also reduced the 
public share of health expenditures, with such measures being im-
posed on Greece, Ireland, and Portugal as conditions for receiving aid 
within the memorandum of understanding. 
Budget consolidation plans also included pension/retirement reforms.  
The retirement age was pushed back to over 65 years in Ireland, Spain, 
Czech Republic, and Germany, and the UK plans to enact more 
quickly a later retirement age that had already been adopted.  Spanish 
and Greek reforms also introduced a cost-containing measure in a new 
calculation of their pension formulas.  European Commission calcula-
tions show a growing divergence in national social expenditures since 
2008 that are geared toward the future (known as “social invest-
ments”), in the realms of health, education, family policies, and active 
labor market policies (Morel and Palier, 2011, Boisson-Cohen et al., 
2015). While spending levels in these areas tended to be marked by 
convergence across EU member countries in the early part of the 
2000s, we now witness a breaking-off point in these areas among a 
number of countries in the periphery (as well as for the UK, Nether-
lands, and Denmark on certain expenditure categories, albeit from a 
higher comparative starting point).   
Therefore, the economic and social dualization that has become in-
creasingly visible in Europe since 2010 can be largely explained by 
the structural differences between EU countries, exacerbated within 
the Eurozone itself, where policies mandated or recommended by the 
EU gave rise to further disparities. This socio-economic dualization 
and its effects do not only spell gloom for many people living in the 
European periphery, they also carry significant consequences for pol-
itics across the continent, a subject to which we now turn.  
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The Political Divide – Dualization of Radicalism 
The economic and social dualization of Europe that we describe in the 
previous sections has significant consequences for politics across Eu-
ropean countries, as well as for the politics of European integration. The 
divide between the European center and periphery, which has been ex-
acerbated by the economic crisis of 2008-9 translates into a powerful 
political dynamic. This dynamic, characterized primarily by the rise of 
radical, populist and anti-European political actors, is seemingly uni-
form across Europe; however, at a closer look, the political trends in 
Europe are markedly distinct across the center and the periphery. Con-
sequently, the economic and social dualization that this chapter demon-
strates engenders a political dualization of radicalism across Europe. 
The economic and social consequences of the crisis produced a situa-
tion in which countries of the European core became keenly aware of 
their creditor status, while the countries of the European periphery be-
came debtors, pressed by the bond markets, the creditor countries, and 
international monetary institutions. As the politics of this situation 
played out, the two broad groups of countries took on different political 
meaning. Viewed from the periphery, the core, embodied particularly 
by Germany, gained an air of the wealthy, unsolidaristic block using the 
European Union and other institutions to force economic austerity and 
social cuts on the peripheral countries struggling with debt and severe 
social problems. Viewed from the center, the periphery, on the other 
hand, epitomized by the extreme case of Greece, gained an impression 
as incompetent and corrupt, using the European Union to obtain struc-
tural funds and cheap credit to run their inefficient economies and state 
apparatuses. Consequently, the populist challengers who have risen in 
the wake of the economic crisis in opposition to their domestic political 
elites, as well as against the European Union, have incorporated these 
divergent grievances into their political appeals.  
 
These dualized views of European politics on the part of radical and 
populist political actors are not merely a product of the recent economic 
crisis and its aftermath. Deep historical divisions in the structure of party 
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competition underpin this dualization. Manow (2015) demonstrates the 
historical divergence between northern and continental European party 
systems on the one hand, and southern European party systems on the 
other. In the European northern core, historical red-green (social demo-
cratic and agrarian) or red-black (social democratic and Christian dem-
ocratic) coalitions created moderate and conciliatory politics, where 
left-wing and right-wing forces collaborated. In the south, on the con-
trary, politics were more starkly marked by the historical state-church 
conflict, precluding cooperation between radically secular left-wing 
parties and right-wing Catholic forces, leaving the left in a ‘working 
class ghetto’ (Esping-Andersen 1985: 9). As a result, Manow (2015: 41) 
finds that southern party systems harbor historically strong and radical 
communist parties, and are polarized over the left-right dimension, as 
well as over the clerical-anticlerical dimension. Given their historical 
trajectories, the party systems of the northern center thus tend to com-
pete more over economic issues, while those of the southern periphery 
tend to be polarized over a combination of economic and non-economic 
political issues (see Rovny and Polk 2014, and Polk and Rovny 2018).  
These distinct competitive patterns affect the orientation of political 
challengers. The literature on challengers and niche parties suggests 
that political upstarts seek to disrupt the ideological fabric of political 
contest by shifting the locus of competition to new issues, unaligned 
to the standing political structure (Riker 1986, Meguid 2005, 2008, 
Adams et al. 2006, Hobolt and De Vries 2011). The historical nature of 
party systems across the European center and periphery thus suggests 
that the northern and continental challengers use non-economic, socio-
cultural arguments to upset their more economically-oriented domestic 
party competition, while in the southern systems, challengers, embold-
ened by the economic and social hardships post crisis, take up the his-
torical role of communist parties, and challenge the system on the radi-
cal left (see Polk and Rovny – this volume – for more detail).  
As a consequence, we see the rise of radical right and right-wing pop-
ulist parties in the European core, while the periphery experiences a 
rise of radical left, or left-wing populist parties. This pattern is borne 
  LIEPP Working Paper n° 71 
 
19 
 
out by empirical evidence summarized in Figure 3. The figure shows 
that radical right parties enjoy continuing rise of support in the center 
and north of Europe, a rise that has slightly accelerated after the eco-
nomic crisis. In the periphery, radical right parties also receive in-
creased support after the crisis, but it is much lower than in the center. 
On the contrary, the support for the radical left remains stably low in 
the center, while the periphery sees an explosion of radical left support 
after the economic crisis.  
These dynamics have a major impact on the view of the European Un-
ion and the integration project as a whole. As noted above, the Euro-
pean Union is generally disliked by political challengers of all kinds 
(e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2008). Our point is, however, that the con-
tempt for the Union differs fundamentally across the European center 
and periphery. The political challengers of the European core, who 
largely adhere to radical right-wing views, detest the Union as a force 
joining their ‘successful’ countries with those struggling on the pe-
riphery, for expecting the core to provide solidaristic support and 
bailouts to the periphery, and for attracting large-scale migration from 
the periphery and elsewhere in and out of Europe. In short, in the Eu-
ropean core, the right-wing challengers see the Union as a vehicle for 
dissolving their perceived national economic achievements and na-
tional social and ethno-cultural fabric by linking it to the periphery.  
 
In the periphery, the mostly radical left challengers oppose the Union 
as a power structure imposing draconian austerity, and relocating eco-
nomic decision-making into the hands of European, international, and 
market actors. In short, in the European periphery, the left-wing chal-
lengers view the Union as an undemocratic, capitalist exploiter. This 
mechanism may be self-reinforcing. As mainstream right parties in 
power in the central countries feel pressured by their rising radical 
right competitors, they push for tougher austerity measures throughout 
the Union. These measures, or even just the rhetoric, further fuel the 
success of the radical left in the southern periphery.  
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Figure 3. Radical left and right-wing support across the center and periphery. 
Parlgov database (Döring and Manow 2015).  
 
To be sure, the divergent views of the European Union, tinted by the 
glasses of one’s ideology, have been well documented (see Marks, 
Wilson and Ray 2002). Recent research suggests a certain European 
homogeneity, as political issues pertaining to European integration, 
immigration, and international trade become increasingly intertwined, 
and politically salient across the continent. This transnational cleavage 
seems to be arising across the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2017).  
Nonetheless, EU opposition retains diverse ideological flavors. The 
famous argument of Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) demonstrating 
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the relationship between left-right ideology and support for EU inte-
gration holds. Hooghe et al. show that while both radical left and rad-
ical right parties tend to systematically oppose European integration, 
mainstream parties located around the political center tend to be sig-
nificantly more supportive. This inverted-U relationship between Eu-
ropean integration and left-right ideology has been confirmed by re-
cent empirical research (Bakker et al. 2015), underlining its durability.  
Our argument, however, suggests that these distinct views of the Un-
ion appear as a function of location in the European periphery or core. 
To emphasize our point, Figure 4 locates four groups of parties – rad-
ical left, major left, major right and radical right – in a two-dimen-
sional political space defined by the general left-right dimension (x-
axis) and support for EU integration (y-axis) across the European cen-
ter and periphery. Plotting these party groups indeed reproduces the 
inverted-U curve in both parts of Europe. However, depicting the 
mean electoral vote share of the groups highlights the fact that radical 
right parties are dominant in the center, while radical left parties out-
perform the radical right in the periphery. The inverted-U relationship 
remains, but the left leg of the U stands to a greater extent in the EU 
periphery, while its right leg extends further into the EU core.  
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Figure 4. Positions of party groups, and their mean vote share  
(CHES 2014 – Bakker et al. 2015, and Parlgov - Döring and Manow 2015) 
 
Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates that the convergence of economic perfor-
mance of European countries has been reversed in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis of 2008. This watershed has seen the rise of a Euro-
pean core, marked by a relatively short period of economic and social 
duress, and a European periphery, which was set onto a general down-
ward trajectory. While the differences between these two broad groups 
of European countries had been diminishing over the course of the 
1990s and 2000s, from 2010 onwards, we see the rise of a great dual-
ization between the European core and periphery.  
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We suggest that this dualization is not a product of the 2008 crisis. 
This crisis was a mere catalyst, bringing to the foreground the diver-
gent bases of the economies of the core and the periphery. Since the 
production of the European core is rooted in export-oriented indus-
tries, it focuses on competitiveness and wage control. On the contrary, 
most of the economies of the periphery are demand-driven, based on 
salary increases even at the cost of fiscal laxity. Consequently, the per-
ceived convergence disguised a major imbalance between the two Eu-
ropean blocks, which the crisis of 2008 brutally unveiled.  
This paper has provided some empirical evidence as to the extent of 
the initial convergence prior to 2010, and the subsequent divergence. 
Using difference-in-difference models we demonstrated a striking di-
vergence in GDP growth and different types of unemployment be-
tween the European periphery and center.  
Given the dire consequences these dynamics have on many Europeans 
in both regions of the continent, we argue that these economic and 
social developments have significant impact on European politics. An-
alysts and pundits alike have noted the general rise of anti-European, 
radical, and populist parties in recent years. While agreeing with these 
observations, this chapter demonstrates heterogeneous political out-
comes across the European center and periphery. While the European 
Union is opposed by all radicals and populists, this phenomenon oc-
curs for different reasons across the center and the periphery. In the 
center, radical and populist forces oppose the EU as a vehicle for as-
sociation with the periphery for its perceived weakening of economic, 
national, and social foundations, which are seen as strained by bailouts 
as well as by mass migration. In the periphery, the radicals oppose the 
European Union as a conduit for capitalist exploitation by the core 
countries, which supposedly deny social support and impose austerity. 
Consequently, the core countries, concerned about their national 
achievements, tend towards right-wing radicalism and populism, 
while the peripheral countries, united in their economic and social 
problems, tend towards left-wing radicalism and populism. The eco-
nomic dualization of Europe thus feeds a second, political, dualization 
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of radicalism, the implications of which are only beginning to be fully 
realized. 
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